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Available online xxxxWe investigate emigrant self-selection according to institutional quality using up to 3566
observations on bilateral migration ﬂows from 77 countries over the 1990–2000 period. We
relate these ﬂows to differences in political and economic institutions. We improve and expand
upon previous studies by (i) examining decade-long migration ﬂows that (ii) include ﬂows not
only to OECD countries but also to non-OECD countries, also (iii) utilizing an estimation
method that takes into account the information in zero value migration ﬂows and (iv) exam-
ining not only total migration ﬂows but also college-educated and non-college-educated sub-
samples separately. We ﬁnd that economic freedoms are a signiﬁcant pull factor for potential
migrants. Once economic freedoms are controlled for, measures of political institutions do
not always enter signiﬁcantly into our estimations. Results are similar for college- and non-
college-educated subsamples. Improvements in legal systems and property rights appear to
be the strongest pull factor for potential migrants.
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Brain drainGive me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, […]Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” 18831. Introduction
Engraved within the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor, Emma Lazarus' sonnet expresses both the idea that
conventional economic “pull” factors (e.g., income per capita) determine migration ﬂows into a country as also the more romantic
notion that potential emigrants are “yearning to breathe free”; that they will leave their homelands in search of liberty.
Economists are not known to be particularly romantic. They are more likely to express Lazarus' notion in terms of emigrant
self-selection according to institutional preferences.
Only a handful of studies explore the role of self-selection according to institutional quality in determining international
migration (e.g., Karemara et al., 2000; Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Melkumian, 2006; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008; Ariu et al., 2014;
Poprawe, 2015). However, there are good reasons to think that improvements in institutional quality are an important pull factor.ar, the economic seminar of American University of Beirut, the 2015 Public Choice Society meetings, and the
valuable comments. We thank Randy Holcombe in particular for his comments at the 2015 PCS meetings.
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2 M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxFreedoms may be intrinsically valued as an input to subjective well-being, and studies have documented that they are positively
associated with individuals' self-reported happiness even after controlling for income (Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Gehring,
2013; Nikolaev, 2014; Nikolova and Graham, 2015).
In this paper, we ask whether economic and political freedoms of potential destinations relative to origins are signiﬁcant
determinants of migration decisions. We employ cross-country data on up to 3566 bilateral migration ﬂows from 77 countries
during the 1990–2000 period. We relate these ﬂows to measures of institutional quality in potential destinations relative to origin
countries. We use the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggars, 2010) and checks and balances (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) measures of
political institutions, and the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index as a measure of economic institutions
(Gwartney et al., 2014).1
Ashby (2010) examines a cross-section of bilateral migration stocks for 58 countries and also migration ﬂows to OECD
countries between 2001 and 2006. He reports that economic freedom differentials are positively associated with bilateral migra-
tions. Political freedom, alternatively, does not enter Ashby's regressions positively when economic freedom is controlled for.
Our results regarding economic freedom are consistent with those of Ashby (2010). Furthermore, they are based on a substan-
tially larger sample that includes migration ﬂows from non-OECD countries to other non-OECD countries. The larger sample
allows us to report separate effects for destination-origin differentials in each of the EFW index's constituent areas. We report
that migrants are attracted to destinations with sounder currencies, less burdensome regulations, and stronger property rights
and legal systems. The estimated effect on the latter EFW area (property rights and legal systems) is particularly large. Unlike
Ashby, however, we report that whether or not political freedoms are signiﬁcant determinants of migration decisions depends
critically on the speciﬁcation of the destination-origin institutional gaps.
We also report results for college-educated and non-college-educated subsamples. In doing so, we ask whether differentials in
institutional quality contribute importantly to “brain drain” vis-á-vis more conventional pull factors such as income differentials.
Outﬂows of human capital can directly lead to lower productivity in an origin country; also indirectly if the economy's ability to
innovate and adopt new technologies is decreased (Marchiori et al., 2013).2 However, we report that greater economic freedom
appears to be equally attractive to non-college-educated and college-educated migrants. Furthermore, controlling for economic
freedom, the destination-origin income differential has a considerably larger estimated effect on college-educated migration.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our contribution in relation to existing literature. We discuss our
empirical model and the data that we employ to estimate it in Section 3. In Section 4, we report our results and then concluding
comments are the stuff of Section 5.2. Our contribution and the existing literature
Only a handful of previous papers empirically examine emigrant self-selection according to institutional preferences. Karemara
et al. (2000) and Melkumian (2006) report that measures of civil and economic freedom, respectively, in an origin country
negatively predict emigration to the US. Vogler and Rotte (2000) report a similar result based on a measure of political freedom
and migration from 86 Asian and African countries to Germany.3 Ariu et al. (2014) and Poprawe (2015) examine differences in
the quality of governance and corruption in relation to migration ﬂows. Finally, papers by Bang and Mitra (2011), Baudassé
and Bazillier (2014), Naghsh Nejad (2013), Ferrant and Tuccio (2013), and Naghsh Nejad and Young (2015) assess the role of
women's rights provisions in determining, speciﬁcally, female migration ﬂows.
The paper closest to the present study is Ashby (2010) who examines a cross-section of bilateral migration stocks for 58
countries, and also annual migration ﬂows to OECD countries between 2001 and 2006. He employs the Fraser Institute's Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) scores and Freedom House's political freedom scores as institutional measures. He reports that
economic freedom differentials between destination and origin countries positively predict bilateral migrations. Alternatively,
political freedom is not a signiﬁcant correlate once either income or economic freedom differentials are controlled for.4
We extend and improve upon Ashby's study in a number of ways. First, we examine a cross-section of bilateral migration ﬂows
for up to 77 countries over a 10-year period (1990–2000). This is a larger sample of countries and, more importantly, examining
migration ﬂows is preferable. We would like to know how relative institutional qualities relate to migrant choices during a
corresponding time period. Ashby acknowledges this and examines ﬂows in his panel analysis. However, Ashby's panel has a
less-than-ideal annual frequency. In addition to cyclical variation in migration ﬂows, annual variation in institutional measures
is likely to have a large noise component. (At least in any meaningful sense, the “rules of the game” – North, 1990, p. 3 – evolve
a bit more slowly.)
Second, our data include not only migration ﬂows to OECD countries but also OECD to non-OECD ﬂows as well as intra-non-
OECD ﬂows. OECD countries tend to have relatively high scores on measures of both economic and political institutions. Focusing1 To check robustness and make the results comparable to some previous studies, we also employ the Freedom House political freedoms and civil liberties scores.
2 See Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for a review of the literature on brain drain.
3 Bang andMitra (2011) report that, for emigrants to the US, the extent of corruption in the origin (measured by the International Country Risk Group (ICRG) index)
negatively predicts migration. Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) assemble a panel of migration ﬂows to 14 countries (today in the OECD) during 1870–1910 and present
evidence that high-quality political institutions served to attract migrants.
4 Ashby (2007) provides a similar study based on migration ﬂows across the contiguous US states and employing the Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA)
index (Karabegovic et al., 2005).
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Table 1
Summary statistics for variables included in estimations.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation Observations
Total migration 0.000 366,608.812 371.361 6232.187 3812
College migration 0.000 56,608.801 158.604 1461.266 3812
Non-college migration 0.000 310,000.000 236.665 5144.910 3812
Economic freedom gap 0.320 3.124 1.086 0.406 3812
Democracy gap 0.091 11.000 2.274 3.177 3812
Checks and balances gap 0.111 9.000 1.557 1.415 3812
Income gap 0.587 1.703 1.024 0.191 3812
Log distances 5.153 9.892 8.764 0.870 3812
Colonial link 0.000 1.000 0.027 0.162 3812
Common language 0.000 1.000 0.168 0.374 3812
Common second language 0.000 1.000 0.192 0.394 3812
Contiguity 0.000 1.000 0.032 0.175 3812
Total migrant stock 1990 (in 10,000) 0.000 2.653 0.009 0.065 3812
Size of government gap 0.267 5.032 1.155 0.568 3812
Property rights gap 0.224 4.465 1.181 0.743 3812
Sound money gap 0.093 10.800 1.345 1.452 3812
Trade gap 0.116 8.607 1.290 1.046 3812
Regulation gap 0.275 3.904 1.111 0.486 3812
Notes: observation numbers are based on observations of a variable that are included in any estimation. This is why the maximum number of observations asso-
ciated with any estimation is 3566 but all observations in this table all 3812.
3M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxon migration ﬂows to OECD countries put a large emphasis on relatively large institutional quality differentials. Our data allow us
to explore whether Ashby's reported correlations are robust to including more variation from relatively ﬁner cross-country
differences in economic and political institutions.
Third, in addition to OLS estimates, we report Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimations as suggested by Silva
and Tenreyro (2006). This approach has been employed by recent studies to utilize bilateral migration observations that have zero
values.5 These zero value observations are meaningful. For example, during 1990–2000, there was zero net migration from the US
to the Central African Republic. Without utilizing PPML (or some other alternative estimation method), this observation must be
discarded. However, the fact that no US citizen chose to move to the DRC certainly has the potential to inform us about how peo-
ple value institutional quality. Also, during 1990–2000, there was no net migration from India to Kenya. That zero value observa-
tion may tells us something about how factors other than relative institutional qualities affect migration decisions. In either case,
getting an accurate picture of emigrant self-selection according to institutional quality involves taking that variation into account.
Fourth, in all of our estimations, we control for “multilateral resistance,” i.e., the inﬂuence of alternative destinations on migra-
tion to a particular destination (Bertoli and Hernández-Huertas Moraga, 2012; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013).
When the inﬂuence of alternative destinations is ignored, the result can be to overestimate the importance of other observable
characteristics (Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Bertoli et al., 2013). For example, migration from Nicaragua to
Mauritius is rare. The 1990 EFW scores of Nicaragua and Mauritius are, respectively, 2.75 and 6.06. It would likely be wrong to
conclude that few individuals move from Nicaragua to Mauritius because they do not care, all else equal, about the fact that
they are relatively lacking in economic freedom. Controlling for multilateral resistance amounts to specifying certain groups, or
nests, of countries and interacting origin country and nest ﬁxed effects in the estimations. Intuitively, we account for the fact
that, all else equal, intra-Latin American migration is simply more likely to occur than migration from Latin America to Sub-
Saharan Africa.6
Finally, we estimate the effects of economic and political freedom on, separately, college-educated and non-college-educated
migration ﬂows. Positive selection of high-skilled emigrants is well documented and questions regarding the determinants of
“brain drain” are critical for developing economies. Brain drain negatively impacts an economy's ability to innovate and adopt
new technologies (Marchiori et al., 2013).7 Selection of high-skilled migrants may be based on factors such as distance from or-
igin, former colonial relationships, inequality in the origin, and cultural and linguistic proximity (Docquier, 2006; Brückner and
Deffort, 2009; Belot and Hatton, 2012). Importantly, high-skilled, more educated individuals may have better information about
the institutional quality of potential destinations. They also may be better able to reckon ex ante the value that they will place
on them ex post.
While we study the effect of institutional quality on migration decisions, those decisions may have important effects on the
likelihood of institutional change in the origins (Docquier et al., 2014). When an origin's institutions are misaligned with its5 Beine et al. (2011), Bertoli and Fernández-HuertasMoraga (2013), Ortega andPeri (2013), and Beine and Parsons (2012) are someof thepapers that have adopted a
similar technique.
6 Multilateral resistance refers to the inﬂuence of alternative destinations on migration to a particular destination. In the Nicaragua–Mauritius example, we are control-
ling for the fact that if someone from Nicaragua is thinking of moving to Mauritius because it has more economic freedom, there choice will likely be (negatively) in-
ﬂuenced by the fact that comparable gains in economic freedom are available by migration to alternative destinations in Latin America, e.g., Costa Rica (1990 EFW
score = 6.64).
7 Docquier and Rapoport (2012) provide review of the literature on brain drain.
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Table 2
Countries included in the analysis; grouped by “nests”.
Asia MENA Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Western Democracies Eastern European
China Algeria Argentina Angola Australia Hungary
Indonesia Egypt Bahamas Cote d'Ivoire Austria Poland
India Morocco Barbados Central African Rep. Belgium Romania
Japan Tunisia Belize Ghana Canada Russia
Malaysia Turkey Bolivia Kenya Denmark
Philippines Brazil Mauritius Finland
Singapore Chile Nigeria France
Sri Lanka Colombia Zambia Germany
South Korea Costa Rica Zimbabwe Greece
Thailand Cuba Iceland
Dominican Republic Ireland
Ecuador Italy
El Salvador Netherlands
Guatemala New Zealand
Guyana Norway
Haiti Portugal
Honduras Spain
Jamaica Sweden
Jamaica Switzerland
Mexico UK
Nicaragua US
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
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the case of the former, individuals seek to affect institutional change in their origins. Alternatively, individuals can exit and mi-
grate to a different country with institutions aligned more closely to their preferences. On the one hand, exiting is a substitute
for institutional change in the home country. On the other hand, exiting may also put individuals in an institutional setting
where they are more able to express their dissatisfaction with origin institutions and lobby for change. Docquier et al. (2014)
and Lodigiani and Salomone (2012) present evidence in this vein.8
The above-cited studies are interesting in their own right and also raise concerns for endogeneity in our own study. To
alleviate endogeneity concerns in general, we control for three types of ﬁxed effects (origin, destination, and origin interacted
with nest). In regards to reverse causation in particular, the above-cited studies suggest that migration positively affects origin
institutional quality. Furthermore, other researchers have suggested that migration negatively affects destination institutional
quality, especially when migration comes from lower institutional quality origins (e.g., Borjas, 2014, forthcoming; Collier,
2013).9 If these suggestions are accurate, then they will bias our results against ﬁnding that destination relative institutional qual-
ity is a positive determinant of migration.3. Empirical model and data
We estimate gravity models of the forms,8 Spil
Docquie
and Salo
women
9 Clar
dom an
Pleas
qualln Migrationijs
 
¼ βi þ β j þ βinþβ1 Institutions Gapij
 
þ βZZij þ εij: ð1ÞMigrationijs is the bilateral migration ﬂow from origin i to destination j of individuals of education level s. In the context of our
data, s will correspond to all (or total), college-educated, or non-college-educated. βi, βj, and βi⁎n are origin, country, and origin–
nest interaction ﬁxed effects. (The “nests” will be deﬁned below.) The error term is εij.imbergo (2009) ﬁnds that returning emigrants who obtain education while in democratic destinations tend to promote democratic reforms in their origins.
r et al. (2014) indeedﬁnd that emigration is associatedwith increases in the political and economic freedoms available in the origin country. Relatedly, Lodigiani
mone (2012) report that total immigration to destinations with greater political empowerment of women is associated with greater political participation of
in the origin country.
k et al. (2015), alternatively, present evidence from cross-country data thatmigration is associatedwith, at best, positive impacts on destination economic free-
d, at worst, no negative impacts.
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Table 3
OLS ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on institutional variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 1.309⁎⁎ 1.791⁎⁎⁎ 0.368
(0.634) (0.547) (0.820)
Checks and balances gap 0.150⁎⁎ 0.144⁎⁎⁎ 0.224⁎⁎⁎
(0.065) (0.054) (0.076)
Democracy gap −0.102⁎⁎ −0.070⁎⁎ −0.185⁎⁎⁎
(0.040) (0.035) (0.050)
Income gap 4.009 2.977 16.566⁎⁎⁎
(4.190) (3.218) (5.445)
Log distances −1.212⁎⁎⁎ −0.938⁎⁎⁎ −1.137⁎⁎⁎
(0.063) (0.051) (0.076)
Colonial link 0.974⁎⁎⁎ 1.096⁎⁎⁎ 1.362⁎⁎⁎
(0.187) (0.152) (0.234)
Common language 0.455⁎⁎ 0.604⁎⁎⁎ −0.200
(0.214) (0.170) (0.258)
Common second language 0.498⁎⁎ 0.498⁎⁎⁎ 1.057⁎⁎⁎
(0.205) (0.161) (0.248)
Contiguity 0.324⁎ 0.181 0.815⁎⁎⁎
(0.169) (0.133) (0.198)
Total migrant stock 1990 0.022⁎⁎⁎ 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.027⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Origin ﬁxed fffects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed fffects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 2246 2197 1926
R2 0.840 0.875 0.804
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 4
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on institutional variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 7.035⁎⁎⁎ 8.647⁎⁎⁎ 7.208⁎⁎⁎
(1.413) (1.723) (1.613)
Checks and balances gap −0.003 0.011 0.063
(0.091) (0.090) (0.117)
Democracy gap 0.002 −0.090 0.033
(0.080) (0.069) (0.091)
Income gap 9.122 28.236⁎ 13.746
(8.138) (14.412) (8.906)
Log distances −1.223⁎⁎⁎ −0.748⁎⁎⁎ −1.308⁎⁎⁎
(0.095) (0.115) (0.122)
Colonial link 0.517⁎⁎ 0.560⁎⁎ 0.642⁎⁎
(0.240) (0.233) (0.258)
Common language 0.014 0.552⁎⁎ −0.642⁎⁎
(0.255) (0.218) (0.290)
Common second language 1.352⁎⁎⁎ 0.932⁎⁎⁎ 1.816⁎⁎⁎
(0.198) (0.197) (0.261)
Contiguity −0.384 −0.231 −0.097
(0.243) (0.218) (0.277)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.909⁎⁎⁎ 1.737⁎⁎⁎ 2.321⁎⁎⁎
(0.209) (0.411) (0.313)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3566 3531 3506
R2 0.990 0.926 0.995
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 5
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on alternative (difference-based) institutional gap measures.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 29.175⁎⁎⁎ 36.910⁎⁎⁎ 34.665⁎⁎⁎
(6.430) (9.236) (7.686)
Democracy gap 1.387⁎⁎⁎ 1.431⁎⁎⁎ 1.562⁎⁎⁎
(0.266) (0.434) (0.311)
Checks and balances gap 17.710⁎⁎⁎ 22.866⁎⁎⁎ 21.016⁎⁎⁎
(3.803) (5.647) (4.601)
Income gap 21.964⁎⁎⁎ 49.485⁎⁎⁎ 25.801⁎⁎⁎
(7.625) (16.845) (9.004)
Log distances −1.201⁎⁎⁎ −0.714⁎⁎⁎ −1.284⁎⁎⁎
(0.101) (0.128) (0.131)
Colonial link 0.489⁎⁎ 0.483⁎⁎ 0.661⁎⁎
(0.239) (0.232) (0.264)
Common ofﬁcial language −0.076 0.399⁎ −0.746⁎⁎
(0.266) (0.240) (0.314)
Common second language 1.391⁎⁎⁎ 1.027⁎⁎⁎ 1.868⁎⁎⁎
(0.210) (0.219) (0.291)
Contigity −0.268 −0.110 0.013
(0.258) (0.230) (0.295)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.842⁎⁎⁎ 1.705⁎⁎⁎ 2.281⁎⁎⁎
(0.236) (0.491) (0.344)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3566.000 3531.000 3506.000
R2 0.989 0.922 0.995
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, The institution variables are calculated based on the differences between destination and origin. Origin, destination and
origin*nest ﬁxed effects are included.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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qualMigrationijs ¼ Stock of Migrantsijs;2000−Stock of Migrantsijs;1990: ð2ÞThese observations are net ﬂows over the 1990–2000 period. All migration data come from the data set described by Docquier
et al. (2009). Note that we do not scale migration ﬂows by origin population. This is standard in the literature; ﬁxed effects
capture the population effects. Recent examples include Beine et al. (2011), McKenzie et al. (2013), and Ortega and Peri (2013).
Migration ﬂows are related to a vector of gaps in measured institutional quality between destinations and origins,
Institutions_Gapij, where an element of this vector is constructed asInstitution Gapij ¼
Institution Measurej;1990
Institution Measurei;1992
: ð3ÞIn deﬁning the gap as a ratio, we follow the practice of Ashby (2010). Since our dependent variable enters in natural log form,
deﬁning the gap as a ratio allows for the interpretation of the coefﬁcient estimate as an approximate elasticity. For example, if an
origin and destination start from identical levels of institutional quality (Institutions_Gapij = 1), the estimated coefﬁcient implies
the corresponding percentage change in the migration ﬂow that is associated with a 1% increase in destination institutional
quality.10
Our institutional measures are (a) Polity IV democracy scores (Marshall and Jaggars, 2010), (b) checks and balances measures
from Keefer and Stasavage (2003), and (c) the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World scores (Gwartney et al., 2014).
The Polity IV democracy and checks and balances measures are based on dimensions of political institutional quality. Democracy
places particular emphasis on the recruitment of and the constraints placed on the executive branch of a government. It is
based on a scale of 0–10, with 10 representing the highest quality of political institutions.11 Checks and balances, alternatively,ile we follow the Ashby's (2010) prior study in deﬁning the institutional gap as a ratio, we recognize that there are other reasonable ways to deﬁne the gap. A
forward alternative is to simply use the difference between destination and origin institutionalmeasures.We also ran estimations based on this alternative def-
f the institutional gap. How those results differ from those based on institutional gaps deﬁned by (3) is discussed in Section 4 below.
adjust the scale to 1–11 to avoid undeﬁned values of the institutional gap (3).
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Table 6
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on institutional variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Size of government gap 0.439 0.147 0.240
(0.341) (0.334) (0.445)
Property rights gap 1.550⁎⁎ 1.592⁎ 1.809⁎⁎
(0.664) (0.899) (0.786)
Sound money gap 0.322⁎⁎ 0.411⁎⁎⁎ 0.387⁎⁎⁎
(0.126) (0.142) (0.135)
Trade gap −0.419 −0.214 −0.211
(0.294) (0.385) (0.356)
Regulation gap 0.997⁎ 1.281⁎⁎ 0.990⁎
(0.536) (0.539) (0.560)
Checks and balances gap −0.029 −0.036 0.044
(0.093) (0.086) (0.119)
Democracy gap 0.037 −0.086 0.074
(0.087) (0.071) (0.098)
Income gap 16.367⁎ 42.498⁎⁎⁎ 16.772⁎
(8.808) (15.867) (9.398)
Log distances −1.221⁎⁎⁎ −0.732⁎⁎⁎ −1.299⁎⁎⁎
(0.101) (0.127) (0.129)
Colonial link 0.581⁎⁎ 0.592⁎⁎ 0.750⁎⁎⁎
(0.254) (0.251) (0.277)
Common language −0.058 0.468⁎⁎ −0.700⁎⁎
(0.262) (0.231) (0.292)
Common second language 1.455⁎⁎⁎ 1.035⁎⁎⁎ 1.893⁎⁎⁎
(0.206) (0.209) (0.272)
Contiguity 0.439 0.147 0.240
(0.341) (0.334) (0.445)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.550⁎⁎ 1.592⁎ 1.809⁎⁎
(0.664) (0.899) (0.786)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3517 3491 3473
R2 0.989 0.922 0.995
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
7M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxis based on data from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2010) on the number of “veto players” (i.e., decision
makers whose agreement is necessary for a policy change to occur) that exist in a country's political system. A higher checks and
balances score corresponds, like Polity IV, to greater restraint on government.12
Greater representation in the choice of, and subsequent restraints on, the executive (as measured by Polity IV) is an uncontro-
versial measure of political freedom. However, the use of the checks and balances score deserves a bit more comment. On the one
hand, a greater number of veto players checks government tendencies toward authoritarian policies. On the other hand, a greater
number of veto players can also be associated with political deadlock and lack of responsiveness to citizen preferences. While a
higher checks and balances score may indicate political freedom from intrusive government policies, it may also represent less
effective representation in government policies. We admit, then, that its interpretation as a measure of political freedom is subject
to interpretation. However, including this variable in our analysis at least has the virtue of introducing a control for certain dimen-
sions of political institutions that are not measured by the Polity IV measure. Furthermore, knowing how those other dimensions
of political institutions are associated with migration ﬂows may, in and of itself, be interesting.
The Economic Freedom of the World index is constructed on ﬁve equally weighted components: (i) government size, (ii) legal
structure and property rights, (iii) access to sound money, (iv) the freedom to trade internationally, and (v) the regulation of mar-
kets. This measure is a comprehensive indicator of the quality of economic institutions and policies. Numerous studies have doc-
umented a positive correlation between economic freedom and economic growth in cross-country data (e.g., Ayal and Karras,
1998; Dawson, 1998; Gwartney et al., 1999; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Young and Sheehan,12 There are alternativemeasures of institutional quality thatwe could explore—for example, theWorld Bank'sWorld Governance Indicators (which are employed in
the studies by Ariu et al. (2014) and Poprawe (2015). However, in this study, we are interested in the role of freedoms – economic and political; rather than the quality
of governance – in determining migration decisions.
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Table 8
PPML ﬁxed effect estimation of migration ﬂows on each institutional variable separately.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 7.077⁎⁎⁎ 8.886⁎⁎⁎ 7.185⁎⁎⁎
(1.404) (1.684) (1.611)
Observations 3680⁎ 3649⁎⁎ 3620
R2 0.990 0.925 0.995
Checks and balances gap −0.049 −0.071 0.007
(0.097) (0.083) (0.127)
Observations 3802 3768 3742
R2 0.989 0.922 0.995
Democracy gap −0.024 −0.156 0.013
(0.085) (0.167) (0.096)
Observations 3686 3649 3626
R2 0.989 0.922 0.995
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
In all the regressions, the control variables similar to those in Table 4 are included. The complete estimation tables are presented in the Appendix A.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 7
Pairwise correlations of institutional gaps.
Economic freedom gap Checks and balances gap Democracy gap
Economic freedom gap 1
Checks and balances gap 0.4619 1
Democracy gap 0.3679 0.6277 1
8 M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx2014).13 Economic freedom is scored, for each country, on a scale of 0–10, with 10 indicating institutions that are most conducive
to individual choice, competitive markets with free entry, and security in one's private property and person.
The vector Zij in (1) contains our other group of origin–destination speciﬁc controls, and also various ﬁxed effects (discussed
below). Regarding origin–destination speciﬁc controls, we follow Mayer and Zignago (2011) and include a contiguity dummy to
capture the effect of being geographic neighbors. We also control for the bilateral (log) distance between country pairs.14 We
also include a colonial link dummy that takes the value of 1 for country pairs that have a past colonial relationship. Colonial re-
lationships can imply similar cultures and other institutions, which may be associated with lower migration costs. Empirically, for-
mer colonizers tend to have particularly high migrant stocks from their former colonies. In a similar spirit, we include a common
language dummy that takes a value of 1 if 20% or more of the origin and destination populations speak the same language; also a
common second language dummy that takes the value of 1 if more than 9% but less than 20% of the populations speak the same
language. Additionally, we control for the initial total stock of migrants from i who are in j are the start of the migration ﬂow pe-
riod. This stock is included to control for the positive effect that a pre-existing network of migrants from an origin can have on
subsequent migration decisions of individuals from that origin. Lastly, we include the per capita income gap between a destination
and an origin country as a control, deﬁned in similar fashion to (4) above. These data are collected from the World Bank. We use
1990 values for these control variables. Table 1 contains summary statistics for all variables included in our analysis.
3.1. Estimation methods
The use of two gravity model speciﬁcations is motivated by the occurrence of zero value observations for some country pairs.
We apply OLS to the gravity model (1). However, when observed migration ﬂows are zero, the natural log cannot be taken. This
decreases our observations from a maximum of 3566 to a maximum of 2246. And zero value observations can be informative.
When they are discarded, the researcher is implicitly claiming that, for example, the fact that no one from Norway chose to
migrate to the Democratic Republic of Congo tells us nothing about the determinants of migration decisions, generally and in
regards to institutional quality in particular. We therefore also employ the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood method13 See deHaan et al. (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature. The Fraser Institute's index has also been related positively to health outcomes (Stroup, 2007),
political freedoms (Lawson and Clark, 2010), the extent of trust within a population (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006), labor shares (Young and Lawson, 2014), and mea-
sures of subjectivewell-being Ovaska and Takashima (2006), Gehring (2013), andNikolaev (2014). For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature utilizing the
Fraser Institute's EFW index as a control variable see Hall and Lawson (2013).
14 We use the geodesic distances between major cities for this variable.
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information contained in the dependent variable observations of zero.15 Because the PPML method is the nonlinear form, the
dependent migration ﬂow variable is not logged (unlike the case of OLS). Silva and Tenreyro (2011) argue that the Poisson pseu-
do-maximum likelihood estimation is robust to the presence of a large number of zeroes in the data. Moreover, they argue that
while the traditional gravity model is biased in the presence of heteroskedasticiy and while log linearization leads to inconsistent
estimates, the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation is consistent with the assumptions of the underlying RUM model.
All of our estimations contain both origin and destination ﬁxed effects. Additionally, we also control for the inﬂuence of mul-
tilateral resistance. Multilateral resistance refers to a situation where individuals from a particular origin country have migration
preferences for a particular group (or nest) of destination countries (Bertoli and Hernández-Huertas Moraga, 2012; Bertoli and
Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013). In the presence of multilateral resistance, the cross-section dependence can lead to biased
estimates based on either OLS or PPML.
We control for multilateral resistance by following Bertoli and Hernández-Huertas Moraga (2012). They suggest including, in
addition to origin and destination ﬁxed effects, origin–nest ﬁxed effects. The inclusion of these origin nest dummies satisﬁes the
cross dependence requirement for PPML estimation. Intuitively, when we observe migration to a particular destination from a
particular origin, we want to control for the fact that individuals in that origin may have, all else equal, a preference for migrating
to a group of destination that includes that particular one. We deﬁne a group of six “nests”: (i) Asia, (ii) Middle East, (iii) Latin
America, (iv) Sub-Saharan Africa, (v) Western Democracies, and (vi) Eastern Europe.16 The list of countries included in each of
these nests is reported in Table 2. Based on these deﬁnitions, we report both OLS and PPML results when destination, origin,
and origin–nest ﬁxed effects are all included.4. Results
Table 3 reports the OLS estimation results for (1) total migration, (2) college migration, and (3) non-college migration.
Economic freedom differentials are a statistically signiﬁcant correlate with bilateral total migration ﬂows. However, breaking
down the sample, the effect is only statistically signiﬁcant for college-educated migration ﬂows. The OLS estimated effects for po-
litical institutions are puzzling. The checks and balances gap is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with total, college, and non-
college migration ﬂows. Alternatively, the democracy gap is negatively associated with all of those migration ﬂow samples.17
Table 4 reports PPML results for the total, college, and non-college samples. (Recall that with PPML estimation the dependent
variable is not loggEd.) Taking into account zero value migration observations makes a substantial difference. (And these obser-
vations constitute a substantial number of observations: column 1 of Table 3 is based on 2246 observations while the analog for
Table 4 is 3566.) Economic freedom now enters positively and signiﬁcantly (1% level) across the board. The point estimates for
total, college, and non-college samples are remarkably similar (7.035, 8.647, and 7.208, respectively). Neither political institutions
gap enters signiﬁcantly in any of the Table 4 estimations.
To put these estimated economic freedom gap effects quantitatively in perspective, note that since the gap is a ratio, the coef-
ﬁcient estimate is essentially an elasticity.18 Starting from identical economic freedom levels in an origin and potential destination,
if the EFW score of the destination increases by 10% then, all else equal, we expect that the bilateral migration ﬂow from that
origin to that destination increases by somewhere between 70% and 80%. Using the mean bilateral migration ﬂow (about 371)
as a benchmark, that amounts to between 259 and 297 additional migrants. This is a large effect.
We also note that the per capita income gap appears to be more important for college migrants than their non-college coun-
terparts. In the OLS results (Table 3), the income gap only enters signiﬁcantly for non-college and the point estimate is much larg-
er than that for college (16.566 versus 2.977). Once we take into account the information contained in the zero ﬂow observations,
the point estimate for college is more than twice that as for non-college (28.236 versus 13.746). This result is consistent with des-
tination–origin income differentials being based in large part on the returns to human capital. College-educated individuals are
more drawn by a given income differential because by migrating they are more likely to experience an increase in their own in-
come that is commensurate with (or greater than) that differential.19
Other control variables seem to have coefﬁcients in line with the previous literature. Log distance is negative a signiﬁcant in all
three columns of Table 3. When the distance between countries is larger, we expect that, all else equal, the cost of migration is
higher. The magnitude of these effects is the largest for non-college-educated individuals. This is in line with the expectation,
as the returns are higher for the high-skilled migrants, they are, all else equal, more willing to bear higher costs associated15 Moreover, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the log linearization of the traditional gravity model is likely to introduce heteroscedasticity and lead to bias esti-
mates. PPML estimation of Eq. (1) is more consistent with the assumptions of the underlying random utility maximization model (Borjas, 1987) and less likely to in-
troduce heteroscedasticity and bias.
16 In principle, it would be desirable to employ a ﬁner deﬁnition of nests. However, a basic issue with the Bertoli and Hernández-Huertas Moraga (2012) approach is
the degrees of freedom that one loses by employing such a large number of dummy variables (up to 472, to be exact).
17 The point estimates on both political institutions gaps are an order ofmagnitude smaller than those associatedwith the economic freedom gap.However, the sample
standard deviations for the political institutions gaps are an order of magnitude larger than that of the economic freedom gap. (See Table 1.)
18 Even though PPML estimation does not use the log of the migration ﬂow as the dependent variable (so that observations with value of zero can be utilized), the
coefﬁcients can be interpreted similarly to those of the OLS estimation because PPML is based on the nonlinear form of the gravity model.
19 Incomegaps and economic freedomgaps are correlatedwith one another. (The simple correlation between the two variables in our sample is 0.3938.) This creates a
collinearity concern in our estimations. However,while thismight inﬂate the standard error on the incomegap estimate, it is unclear as towhy thiswouldbe a particular
problem in the non-college migration estimations relative to the college migration estimations.
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10 M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwith long-distance moves. The colonial link variable enters positively and signiﬁcantly as expected. This variable captures the for-
mal and informal cultural proximities between origin and destination countries created by their colonial links. These links have
been associated with higher migration ﬂows. For this variable, we also ﬁnd that the effects are larger for non-college-educated
migrants. The common language dummy and the common second language dummy positively affect migration ﬂows. A common
language lowers the costs of migration and these results are in line with what has previously been reported. A contiguity dummy
variable enters positively and signiﬁcantly, but only for non-college migrants. This may be due largely to seasonal migration across
neighboring countries. The total migration stock in 1990, as a measure of previous network of migrants, enters positively and sig-
niﬁcantly as we would expect, with larger effects for non-college-educated migrants.
We also ran the Table 4 estimations using the difference between destination and origin institutional scores rather than their
ratio. The results are reported in Table 5 and the main difference is that the democracy and checks and balances gaps now enter
positively and signiﬁcantly (1% level in all cases, as is also the case for the economic freedom gaps). Our benchmark (ratio-based)
measure of institutional gaps is consistent with Ashby's (2010) previous study of economic freedom and migration, and it allows
us to interpret the coefﬁcient estimates as elasticities. However, there is no clear reason for preferring the ratio to the difference.
Determining relative political freedoms factor signiﬁcantly into migration decisions appears to depend critically on the speciﬁca-
tion of the institutional gaps. Alternatively, the same is not true for the economic freedom gap, which enters positively and signif-
icantly regardless of that choice of speciﬁcation.
Table 4 suggests that for migrants of all education levels, destination–origin differentials in economic freedom are signiﬁcant
determinants of bilateral migration ﬂows.20 The EFW index has 5 constituent areas: size of government, legal system and property
rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of business, credit, and labor markets. Table 6 re-
ports results for PPML estimations that are analogous to those of Table 4 except that the 5 EFW areas are included in the estima-
tions individually. Overall, economic freedom is still signiﬁcant while the political institutions gaps are not. However, we
speciﬁcally see that three EFW areas enter signiﬁcantly into the total, college, and non-college estimations: property, sound
money, and regulation. Furthermore, the largest effects are associated with the legal system and property rights area, and those
effects are remarkably similar across the total, college, and non-college subsamples (point estimates of 1.550, 1.592, and 1.809,
respectively).
We also note that income gap results reported in Table 6 are consistent with those from Table 4. The point estimate for college
is again much larger than that for non-college (42.498 versus 16.772). Again, this is consistent with destination–origin income
differentials based largely on returns to human capital.
When employing our benchmark (ratio-based) measures of institutional gaps, political freedoms never enter the estimations
signiﬁcantly. One might suspect that collinearity among the economic freedom, democracy, and checks and balances gaps factor
into this being the case. Indeed, the institutional gaps are positively correlated (Table 7; in particular, the correlation between
the democracy and checks and balances gap is about 0.628). To check on this, Table 8 reports the results of estimations that include
each of the three gaps individually. The main result holds: while economic freedom always enters positively and signiﬁcantly, the
political freedom gaps always enter with small and statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates. As we have seen above
(Table 5), this is not the case when employing the alternative (difference-based) institutional gaps. Again, determining whether
or not political freedom gaps factor signiﬁcantly into migration decisions depends critically on how those gaps are speciﬁed.5. Concluding discussion
In this paper, we employ data from 77 countries during the 1990–2000 time period to explore emigrant self-selection accord-
ing to institutional quality. In particular, we ask whether destination–origin differentials in measures of political and/or economic
institutional quality are determinants of bilateral migration ﬂows.
Our tentative answer is in line with Ashby's (2010) earlier study. Relative increases in economic freedom are signiﬁcantly at-
tractive to potential migrants. Although we echo Ashby's conclusion along these lines, we demonstrate that the result is robust to
a larger sample of countries and examining migration ﬂows over a substantially long (10-year; 1990–2000) period. Alternatively,
we ﬁnd that relative political freedoms do not always enter the estimations signiﬁcantly once economic freedom is controlled for.
In particular, whether or not political freedoms enter signiﬁcantly depends critically on the speciﬁcation of the institutional gaps
between destination and origin countries.
We also ask whether the effects are different for college-educated versus non-college-educated migrants. In regards to eco-
nomic freedom, it appears that the answer is no. Economic freedom differentials are associated with increased migration in
regards to both relatively low- and high-skilled individuals.
While we do not ﬁnd different effects across educational attainment types, we do ﬁnd them across the different dimensions of
economic freedom. In particular, environments of sound money, low regulation, and property rights secured under the rule-of-law
are, all else equal, attractive to potential migrants. The estimated effect of strong property rights is particularly large.
Emma Lazarus famously wrote: “Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free[.]” If the Statue of
Liberty is selling, our results suggest that the potential migrants of the world are buying. All else equal, our results suggest that
migrants look to exit their origins toward destination where they breathe more economically free.20 As a robustness check, we include two more tables in the Appendix A of this manuscript. Table A1, presents the PPML estimations analogous to Table 4 with only
including non-zero observations (i.e., the same observations as the OLS estimations in Table 3). Table A2, shows the result excluding the ﬂows to the United States.
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Table A1
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on institutional variables using only non-zero observations.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 5.027⁎⁎⁎ 7.520⁎⁎⁎ 4.063⁎⁎⁎
(1.334) (1.494) (1.331)
Checks and balances gap −0.014 0.011 −0.005
(0.088) (0.090) (0.109)
Democracy gap −0.034 −0.073 0.157
(0.094) (0.067) (0.126)
Income gap 7.806 21.765⁎ 6.385
(8.158) (12.661) (9.532)
Log distances −1.201⁎⁎⁎ −0.666⁎⁎⁎ −1.062⁎⁎⁎
(0.103) (0.103) (0.113)
Colonial link 0.369 0.521⁎⁎ 0.975⁎⁎⁎
(0.240) (0.243) (0.249)
Common language 0.298 0.562⁎⁎ −0.774⁎⁎⁎
(0.258) (0.221) (0.287)
Common second language 0.980⁎⁎⁎ 0.809⁎⁎⁎ 1.685⁎⁎⁎
(0.201) (0.193) (0.252)
Contiguity −0.137 −0.262 0.090
(0.235) (0.209) (0.235)
Total migrant stock 1990 2.349⁎⁎⁎ 1.975⁎⁎⁎ 2.949⁎⁎⁎
(0.314) (0.430) (0.419)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin * nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 2246 2197 1926
R squared 0.992 0.932 0.997
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table A2
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on institutional variables excluding ﬂow to the US.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 4.817⁎⁎⁎ 6.431⁎⁎⁎ 5.579⁎⁎⁎
(1.585) (1.827) (1.692)
Checks and balances gap −0.027⁎ −0.022⁎⁎ 0.000
(0.092) (0.072) (0.118)
Democracy gap 0.029 −0.070 0.019
(0.073) (0.057) (0.082)
Income gap 1.197 12.369 7.631
(6.318) (7.898) (7.617)
Log distances −1.109⁎⁎⁎ −0.746⁎⁎⁎ −1.107⁎⁎⁎
(0.104) (0.080) (0.128)
Colonial link 0.927⁎⁎⁎ 0.874⁎⁎⁎ 0.902⁎⁎⁎
(0.238) (0.203) (0.274)
Common language −0.005 0.708⁎⁎⁎ −0.159
(0.318) (0.267) (0.359)
Common second language 1.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.413 1.163⁎⁎⁎
(0.322) (0.268) (0.369)
Contiguity −0.207 −0.162 0.074
(0.232) (0.185) (0.271)
Total migrant stock 1990 2.122⁎⁎⁎ 2.462⁎⁎⁎ 2.589⁎⁎⁎
(0.366) (0.385) (0.441)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin * nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3502 3467 3442
R squared 0.807 0.684 0.874
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table A3
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on economic freedom gap variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Economic freedom gap 7.077⁎⁎⁎ 8.886⁎⁎⁎ 7.185⁎⁎⁎
(1.404) (1.684) (1.611)
Income gap 8.963 25.135⁎ 14.304⁎
(6.752) (14.208) (8.011)
Log distances −1.223⁎⁎⁎ −0.747⁎⁎⁎ −1.310⁎⁎⁎
(0.095) (0.113) (0.122)
Colonial link 0.520⁎⁎ 0.561⁎⁎ 0.668⁎⁎⁎
(0.235) (0.229) (0.253)
Common ofﬁcial language 0.012 0.563⁎⁎⁎ −0.637⁎⁎
(0.253) (0.218) (0.290)
Common second language 1.353⁎⁎⁎ 0.941⁎⁎⁎ 1.817⁎⁎⁎
(0.198) (0.197) (0.261)
Contigity −0.387 −0.246 −0.106
(0.240) (0.214) (0.278)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.909⁎⁎⁎ 1.745⁎⁎⁎ 2.326⁎⁎⁎
(0.208) (0.409) (0.313)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3680 3649 3620
R squared 0.990 0.925 0.995
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table A4
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on checks and balances gap variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Checks and balances gap −0.049 −0.071 0.007
(0.097) (0.083) (0.127)
Income gap 21.047⁎⁎⁎ 48.103⁎⁎⁎ 24.257⁎⁎⁎
(7.346) (16.307) (8.385)
Log distances −1.208⁎⁎⁎ −0.722⁎⁎⁎ −1.291⁎⁎⁎
(0.102) (0.130) (0.132)
Colonial link 0.524⁎⁎ 0.499⁎⁎ 0.704⁎⁎⁎
(0.245) (0.237) (0.270)
Common ofﬁcial language −0.067 0.417⁎ −0.754⁎⁎
(0.269) (0.244) (0.317)
Common second language 1.416⁎⁎⁎ 1.033⁎⁎⁎ 1.901⁎⁎⁎
(0.210) (0.219) (0.293)
Contigity −0.286 −0.139 0.002
(0.260) (0.237) (0.295)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.840⁎⁎⁎ 1.719⁎⁎⁎ 2.269⁎⁎⁎
(0.234) (0.493) (0.340)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3802 3768 3742
R squared 0.989 0.922 0.995
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
12 M.N. Nejad, A.T. Young / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article as: Nejad, M.N., Young, A.T., Want freedom, will travel: Emigrant self-selection according to institutional
quality, European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.06.002
Table A5
PPML ﬁxed effects regressions of migration ﬂows on democracy gap variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Total migration College migration Non-college migration
Democracy gap −0.024⁎ −0.156 0.013
(0.085) (0.167) (0.096)
Income gap 22.039⁎⁎ 52.011⁎⁎⁎ 24.140⁎⁎
(8.872) (15.776) (9.553)
Log distances −1.205⁎⁎⁎ −0.720⁎⁎⁎ −1.291⁎⁎⁎
(0.102) (0.128) (0.132)
Colonial link 0.506⁎⁎ 0.490⁎⁎ 0.701⁎⁎⁎
(0.239) (0.232) (0.263)
Common ofﬁcial language −0.069 0.393 −0.753⁎⁎
(0.265) (0.239) (0.313)
Common second language 1.404⁎⁎⁎ 1.014⁎⁎⁎ 1.904⁎⁎⁎
(0.210) (0.218) (0.293)
Contigity −0.271 −0.101 0.004
(0.259) (0.228) (0.295)
Total migrant stock 1990 1.836⁎⁎⁎ 1.698⁎⁎⁎ 2.269⁎⁎⁎
(0.235) (0.492) (0.341)
Origin ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Destination ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Origin*nest ﬁxed effects Y Y Y
Observations 3686 3649 3626
R squared 0.989 0.922 0.995
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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